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Update to
The European Human Rights System
James W. Hart
This is an update to THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, which described the
founding, development, and bibliography of the Council of Europe (COE), the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It does not
repeat the contents of THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, but describes what
has happened between the publication of that article in 2010 and the end of 2014.
This update covers the alleviation of the pressures on the European Court of Human Rights, improvements in the publication and dissemination of the ECtHR’s
documents, the Draft Treaty of Accession, and the case that is a barrier to accession.

Problems with the European Court of Human Rights
When THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM was published five years ago, the
COE and the ECtHR had the following serious problems:




The number of pending cases was much too large for the Court.
The accession of the European Union to the ECHR had a number of unsolved
complex problems.
Compliance with ECtHR judgments had declined significantly.

Protocol 14 of the ECHR put in place several mechanisms to alleviate the Court’s
enormous load of cases and to improve its efficiency. First, before Protocol 14
came into force, initial decisions on admissibility were made by a three judge
panel; Protocol 14 reduced that to one judge.1 Second, Protocol 14 sends cases that
are “already the subject of well-established case-law of the Court” to a three judge
committee and cases that involve a “subject of well-established case-law of the
Court,” to a chamber of five judges.2 Finally, Protocol 14 raises the bar on the admissibility of cases in which the plaintiff has not “suffered a significant disadvantage.”3
The statistics tell the story. In September 2011 the number of pending cases had
risen to a peak of 160,000; during 2012 it decreased to 128,000;4 and by the end of
2014 it stood at 70,000.5 In three years the number declined by 56 %. Note that
pending cases are those on which the decision on admissibility has not been made.
The Court itself said, “This means that Protocol 14 has been a success, above all…
particularly as regards filtering….”6
Although the Court attributes these dramatic decreases primarily to Protocol 14, it
also believes that Rule 47 of the Rules of Court had a role. That Rule sets the requirements for the contents of individual applications.7 The Rule’s present form is
the result of one amendment made to the original Rule in 2002 and one made in
each of the following years: 2007, 2008, and 2013. The most recent version of
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Rule 47 came into effect on January 1, 2014. In addition, the Court appears to say
that the Rule was not as strictly followed in the past as it has been more recently.8
The Court ascribes the effects of the new Rule 47 to the following:
• the case-processing divisions have less correspondence to deal with;
• incoming applications are now better organized;
• properly-completed application forms make it easier to analyze and
process incoming cases;
• there is a significant gain of time enabling the Registry to deal with other
meritorious cases.9

It is impossible to know how much of the decline in pending cases has been caused
by Protocol 14 and how much by Rule 47. It would take a statistical analysis too sophisticated for a working court in order to determine how much of the decline is
caused by one or the other.

The Publication and Dissemination of Court Documents
Since the publication of THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, the ECtHR has improved the publication and dissemination of its documents. In 2012 and 2013 the
Registry installed an entirely new HUDOC system that provides a number of improvements. In addition to the features described on page 542 of THE EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, it also has an Advanced Search system with thesauri for
states and regions, visit types, visit start date, document date, and publication date.
It also includes a database of communicated cases from 2008 to 2011, and parallel
systems for the work of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the European Social Charter. In 2012 the Registry added an interface in Turkish and
planned on adding one in Russian last year. By 2014 the Turkish version included
2,600 documents. The Registry has also begun a three year project financed by the
Human Rights Trust Fund (HRTF) to translate cases that are important in the
Court’s jurisprudence throughout the continent into the languages of countries in
which knowledge of that jurisprudence is rare. “The beneficiary States of this three
-year project are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia,
the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,’ Turkey and Ukraine.”10

EU Accession to the ECHR11
EU accession to the ECHR is a tale that is too long and complex to describe in detail
here. Let us concentrate on the last two events in the story: the most recent Draft
Treaty of Accession and the CJEU’s Opinion 2/13 of December 18, 2014.
The most important issues that the Draft Treaty of Accession addresses is the allocation of responsibility between the CJEU and the ECtHR, between the EU and its
members, and between the law of the EU and the Convention. The allocation of responsibility between the COE and its members is not mentioned in the Treaty of
Accession because it is already part of the Convention.
4

Preliminaries
An explanation of some preliminary items might make the rest of this paper easier
to understand than it would be without them. The first is the difference between
the legal status of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the one hand and the Statute of the
Council of Europe and the European Human Rights Convention (ECHR) on the
other. The former are predicated as legal. The latter are conventional; they are ordinary international agreements.12 Black’s Law Dictionary defines conventional
law as “A rule or system of rules agreed on by persons for the regulation of their
conduct toward one another; law constituted by agreement as having the force of
special law between the parties, by either supplementing or replacing the general
law of the land. The most important example is conventional international
law….”13 It appears to me that Saventa’s description of the ECHR as “residual” visa-vis the EU legal system explains the difference.14 “Thus the court and the Convention are considered to be safety nets under the national legal systems that assure
the people of those nations that they have recourse should their legal systems fail to
afford them the rights of the ECHR.”15
The second point is the constitutionality of the primary EU treaties. Some consider
the two EU treaties as the constitution of the EU although the point is not universally accepted. But Daniel Halberstam, whose learned article is based on their constitutionality, relies on the CJEU’s authority on the point.16 In C-2/13, the Court
itself states, “As the Court of Justice has repeatedly held, the founding treaties of
the EU, unlike ordinary international treaties, established a new legal order, possessing its own institutions…the subjects of which comprise not only those States
but also their nationals.17 In the very next paragraph, which seems to me to explain
the previous quote, the Court refers to the EU’s “own constitutional framework.”18
Finally the EU has a unique structure. Superficially it resembles a federation. The
law of the EU is superior to the laws of the member states and affects all of them
while the laws of the member states are equal to each other and the law of each affects only itself.19 But the relationships between the central government and the
member states and among the member states themselves are not the same as that
of a nation state or the signatories to an international agreement. In addition both
the EU and its member states can join international agreements and are subject to
international law. Thus the network of relationships within the EU and with other
political entities outside the EU is substantially more complex than that of other
international organizations. Indeed the EU is unique among political and civil entities.
The different types of law that play a role in accession form a complex network.
The most obvious are EU law, its member states’ laws, the ECHR, and the laws of
its contracting parties. But the situation is not as simple as that. Some EU laws
may affect member states’ citizens directly; other EU laws may need to be implemented through member states’ legal systems. The member states may also make
laws for their self-regulation and have nothing to do with the EU. Finally the EU
and its member states may together or separately have international agreements
5

with other nation states or international organizations. All the member states of
the EU, but not the EU itself, have made the rights from the ECHR part of their
own law and may be taken before the ECtHR by their own citizens.20

The Draft Treaty of Accession
Article 1(2) of the Draft Treaty of Accession makes clear that the Treaty will become part of the ECHR when the entire process of accession is completed. Section
(2) ensures that the ECHR will not require the EU to do anything that contradicts
its laws. Section (3) allows that when a member of the EU or its representative
performs an act that is contrary to the Convention “including decisions taken under the Treaty on European Union and under the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union”, it is the member that is responsible, although the EU may be a
co-respondent.
Article 3 contains the co-respondent mechanism and the potential review of EU
law by the ECtHR. If a member of the EU appears to violate the Convention when
doing or omitting to do something that is compatible with EU law, the EU may become a co-respondent, i.e. a party to the case. If the EU itself appears to violate
the Convention when doing or omitting to do something that is compatible with
EU law, one or more of its member states may become co-respondents. “A High
Contracting Party shall become a co-respondent either by accepting an invitation
from the Court or by decision of the Court upon the request of that High Contracting Party.”21
But this is just the beginning. If an EU member allegedly violated a provision of
the ECHR, and the act or omission was related to EU law, and the CJEU had not
reviewed that provision in the past, then the application should go directly to the
CJEU so that it can review the compatibility of the Convention and the relevant
EU law before the ECtHR rules on it. If, however, the applicant files the complaint
with the ECtHR instead of the CJEU, it is the ECtHR that decides whether or not
the application should go to the CJEU. The Draft Accession Agreement calls for
the ECtHR to make this judgment on the basis of the plausibility that the EU law
is compatible with the ECHR.22 The CJEU’s internal review, however, does not
have the force of law.23 “And… where complainants directly challenge actions of
the EU institutions, the principle of exhaustion of remedies would oblige appellants to take their action to the CJEU first,….”24
In addition to these arrangements for the interactions of the two courts, the Draft
Treaty on Accession also arranges for the EU to participate in the major organs of
the COE. A delegation of the European Parliament could take part in the election
of judges by the COE’s Parliamentary Assembly. The delegation of the EU’s European Parliament in the COE’s Parliamentary Assembly would equal the number of
that of the largest High Contracting Party. “The European Union shall be entitled
to participate in the meetings of the Committee of Ministers, with the right to vote,
when the latter takes decisions.…”25 that concern the reduction of the number of
judges in a chamber to five, the approval of friendly settlements, the enforcement
of judgments, requests for advisory opinions, and the protection of the powers of
6

the COE’s Committee of Ministers. The Committee of Ministers shall consult the
delegation of the EU before the adoption of any other text that 1) relates to the
ECHR or any of its protocols to which the EU is a party, 2) relates to Committee of
Ministers actions in any of the areas on which the EU can vote, or 3) to the selection
of candidates for judge of the ECtHR in the Parliamentary Assembly. Finally, the
Draft Treaty on Accession will not come into force until “the first day of the month
following the expiration of a period of three months after the date” on which all High
Contracting Parties have accepted it.26

The Barrier to Accession
It sounds like everything’s ready to go, right? Not so fast. There are still some substantial problems that need to be solved before accession can become a reality. On
July 4, 2013 the European Commission and a number of EU members requested an
opinion from the CJEU on the compatibility of the Draft Treaty with EU law. The
court’s decision, which was handed down on December 18, 2014, clearly held that
the Treaty is not compatible with EU law for the five following substantial reasons.27
First, the Treaty does not take account of the specific characteristics of EU law in
three ways:28
•

Article 53 of the Convention and Article 53 of the Charter as interpreted by
the CJEU in Melloni v. Ministerio contradict each other.29 Article 53 of the
Convention allows contracting parties to adopt higher human rights standards than are in the Convention. Melloni, on the other hand, disallows member states from raising their human rights standards any higher than those in
the Charter.

•

The absence of an accommodation of the EU’s rule of “mutual trust” in the
Draft Agreement conflicts with the ECtHR jurisprudence on contracting
states responsibility for other members’ implementation of the ECHR rights.
Mutual trust requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, security
and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly
with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law.30

The exceptional circumstances are systemic or wide-spread violations. In
Opinion 2/13 the CJEU states that the “set of common values on which the
EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU... implies and justifies the existence
of mutual trust….”31 Mutual trust is regarded as essential to the stability and
consistency of EU law and it’s absence to be a threat to the EU’s foundation
insofar as it limits conflicts between its members. In point of fact mutual
trust has been considered essential to the EU’s ability to create and maintain
an area without borders. The ECHR’s case law, on the other hand, requires its
contracting states to observe other contracting states’ implementation of its
articles.32 Article 33 of the ECHR allows contracting states to bring
complaints against other contracting states. In addition the ECtHR admits
cases that involve a very small number, even only one, which conflicts with
the EU’s allowance of actions against member states only in cases in which
7

those states violations of fundamental rights is systemic or wide spread.
Moreover, under the Draft Agreement, alleged violations of the ECHR that
involve EU law and are brought by the EU or its member states would be
brought under the standards of the ECtHR. This arrangement would also
end the EU limit on actions between member states for violations of
fundamental rights only when those violations are systemic or wide spread.
Finally since accession would end the rule of mutual trust, the CJEU said
that “…accession is liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and
undermine the autonomy of EU law.33


The Treaty does not exclude the possibility that if national courts were to
request advisory opinions from the ECtHR for interpretation of the ECHR as
allowed by Protocol 16, it is possible that the ECtHR might not send the
application to the CJEU for initial review of any EU law that might be in the
application.34 Protocol 16 allows members’ highest courts to request
advisory opinions as long as it relates to a pending case. After accession, the
Convention would be a part of EU law and if the request for the advisory
opinion was within the scope of EU law, the request should go to the CJEU,
not the ECtHR. But parties could read Protocol 16 to allow them to send
such applications to the ECtHR by mistake thus bypassing the CJEU. Once
again we have external control over EU law. Note, however, that Protocol 16
needs 10 ratifications to come into force, but at this writing has only 2.35

Second, the Draft Treaty violates Article 344 of the TFEU, which says that EU law
can only be interpreted by EU institutions.36 The Court gives the following
explanation:
212. Consequently, the fact that Member States or the EU are able to submit
an application to the ECtHR is liable in itself to undermine the objective of
Article 344 TFEU and, moreover, goes against the very nature of EU law,
which… requires that relations between the Member States be governed by
EU law to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of any other law.37
Note that, as stated earlier, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) plays a constitutional role in EU law. The point of Article 344
is that allowing external powers to interpret EU law would undermine its
stability and consistency. The CJEU insists on being the sole interpreter for
the purpose of keeping the balance in the federal structure.
Next, the CJEU held that the co-respondent system is incompatible with EU law.38
The co-respondent system allows the EU and one or more of its member states to
become a party to a case begun by the other before the ECtHR. The ECtHR may
invite a party, not named in the initial application, to become a co-respondent.
Such an invitation is not binding, which allows an EU invitee to assess the invitation
in the light of EU law. On the other hand, “if the EU or Member States request
leave to intervene as co-respondents in a case before the ECtHR…the ECtHR is to
decide on that request in the light of the plausibility of those reasons.”39 In this case
the decision on EU law is under external control and, in the view of the CJEU, the
8

co-respondent mechanism is incompatible with EU law. By now this should sound
very familiar.
Fourth, Opinion C-2/13 asserts that the Draft Treaty fails to make adequate arrangements for the EU’s prior involvement procedure as required by Article 2 of Protocol 8
EU. The Draft Treaty provides that all cases involving EU law that are brought before
the ECtHR will be referred to the appropriate EU agency by the ECtHR. The prior involvement procedure has three purposes: to 1) to assess the compatibility of the EU
law with the ECHR, 2) to assess the validity of EU secondary law, and 3) to interpret
EU primary law.40 Allowing the ECtHR to decide when to refer applications to an EU
agency to perform these functions certainly appears to put the decision of referral in
external control.
Finally, the Draft Agreement recommends that the ECtHR have jurisdiction over the
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) rules while the CJEU does not have
such jurisdiction in cases that involve the ECHR. Current law provides that the CJEU
has jurisdiction over a small portion of acts that are adopted in the context of the
CFSP. The Draft Agreement then would give the ECtHR jurisdiction over an area of
EU law that the CJEU does not have jurisdiction over. Thus the ECtHR in many such
cases could be the only court to hear such applications. Once again the Draft Agreement “fails to have regard to the specific characteristics of EU law….”41

Conclusion
In the Court’s opinion, the Draft Treaty would allow EU law to be ruled on by an
external court, the ECtHR, and would in many ways fail to maintain the cohesiveness
and autonomy of EU law. Every author that reports on and critiques Opinion C-2/13
has solutions, some of which are carefully reasoned and others that are conjectural.
Although it is admittedly presumptuous of me to say so, please allow me to say that
even this short summary has impressed on me the difficulty, nay, the near impossibility of any accession that would retain both the autonomy of the EU and the jurisdiction of the CJEU. These problems cannot be resolved without each side making substantial concessions to the other. It is unlikely that there will be an accession soon.
Endnotes:
1

James W. Hart, The European Human Rights System 102 LL J 533, at 548. James W. Hart is Senior
Reference Librarian at the University of Cincinnati College of Law’s Robert S. Marx Law Library.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Eur. Court of Human Rights, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 6 (2013).
5 Eur. Court of Human Rights, ANNUAL REPORT 2014 (PROVISIONAL VERSION), at 5 (2015).
6 Id.; Filtering is the judgments made on admissibility.
7 The text of Rule 47 can be found in the Appendix that follows this update.
8 Eur. Court of Human Rights, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVISED RULE ON THE LODGING
OF NEW APPLICATIONS, at 2 (Feb. 2015) and supra note 5, at 5.
Eur. Court of Human Rights, ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 67 (2014). The rest of this article is a very
brief summary of a very complex situation.
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In his retirement, Burns Weston took his ASIL and University of Iowa experiences
and shared them nationwide and indeed worldwide. At the end of his life Professor
Weston was publishing well-received treatises and articles on international environmental law, green governance, and sustainable development.
Burns Weston has influenced the lives of students, professors, human rights activists
and, above all, the many people worldwide who have benefitted from human rights
initiatives for which Professor Weston was catalyst, mentor, and facilitator. Burns
Weston worked wholeheartedly with and for the American Society of International
Law, and contributed untiringly to promoting world peace.

The Informer continues on page 14.
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International Legal Research Group
The International Legal Research Interest Group (ILRIG) is dedicated primarily to its members' professional development in the
areas of foreign, comparative, and international law (FCIL). ILRIG
provides a forum for discussion among legal information professionals, legal scholars, and attorneys. ILRIG enhances its members'
opportunities to share their knowledge about available FCIL resources, research methods, research techniques, and best practices.
ILRIG organizes presentations, publishes a newsletter, and maintains a website that reflects the most recent developments in the
legal research profession.
ILRIG members are particularly mindful of the interdisciplinary
and multicultural aspects of contemporary foreign, comparative,
and international law. Global legal policies and norms cannot exist
without strong foundations built on exhaustive research. ILRIG is
committed to being a forum for discussing ASIL's unique analytical
needs.
ILRIG membership is open to all ASIL members. ILRIG should be
of particular interest to:

Law librarians
Legal scholars
Attorneys with FCIL practice issues
Academic librarians
Scholars working in political science, international relations,
economics, and history
 Research professionals from government agencies, policy
institutes, inter-governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations
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